This paper examines the rise and fall of a special purpose High Wealth Individual (HWI) unit in the Indonesian Directorate General of Taxation (DGT), 2009-2012. Fifty-four participants and observers of the implementation process reported on the contest over the principles and mechanisms of tax reform. The new HWI unit initially brought enthusiasm and dialogue about building relationships with taxpayers and assembling integrated databases of HWI business interests. These ideas, however, conflicted with past institutional practices. Revenue targets assigned to local tax authorities by head office trumped the new unit's priorities. Messaging within the tax authority that the unit would increase revenue collections was not shared with HWIs and their advisers. Assumed deception triggered cynicism that nothing had changed in DGT. The unit failed to perform to expectations. The research shows how local institutions and tax culture can wreak havoc on transfers of international best practice in tax policy.
Introduction
Globalisation and internationalisation have led to rapid sharing of policies and methods of governance around the world (e.g., Drezner 2001; Hoberg 2001) . These processes, theorised in terms of convergence (e.g. , Bennett 1991b; Carroll 1999) , diffusion (e.g., Rogers 2003; Rogers 2009; Savage 1985; Walker 1969 ) and policy transfer (e.g., Bennett 1991a; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; Rose 1991; 1993) , are hastened when epistemic communities and intergovernmental bodies are part of established global networks to share problems, work towards solutions, and coordinate assistance (Haas 1992; Hulme 2005) . Tax Dialogue (ITD) were providing platforms for tax officials and advisers to come together to share their experiences and practices (Pinto and Sawyer 2009; 2011) .
The tax loopholes that have emerged in tax systems of nation states disproportionately benefit large corporations and high wealth individuals (HWIs). One administrative response that has been widely endorsed internationally is the setting up of HWI units within tax authorities to focus attention on this segment of the population and their taxpaying responsibilities in relation to personal taxes (OECD 2009, chap. 3) . In 2003 there were four such units in France (1983) , Australia (1996) , Ireland (2003), and New Zealand (2003) . By 2013 the number had increased to 17 units globally. The reason for the growth is that the very wealthy with mobile capital and global business interests have been able to use legal loopholes to shift their wealth to low taxing jurisdictions or shelter it completely from tax oversight (Tanzi 2012) . This paper examines the establishment and disestablishment of a separate organizational unit dedicated to compliance among Indonesia's high wealth individuals (referred to herein as the HWI unit). A primary adviser for the implementation of the HWI unit in Indonesia was the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), which also had a separate HWI unit in operation at the time. over the purpose and reach of the HWI unit. After two years of operation, the unit's performance was judged by DGT to be unsatisfactory. The operations of the unit were wound back and the direction changed. This paper examines the factors contributing to the fate of the unit. The paper is divided into four sections. First the purpose of High Wealth Individual units is outlined. The appeal of the policy to the Indonesian tax authority is discussed, along with the cultural, political and organizational setting in which it was introduced. The next section presents the theoretical framework of principles, mechanisms and powerful actors operating through webs of control and dialogue to contest implementation. The implementation of HWI tax policy occurred in two distinct phases under two different Director Generals. Next we present evidence from interviews and documents of principles, mechanisms and powerful actors at work and in conflict as the HWI unit struggled to find its place in DGT. Last the failure of the policy transfer to meet expectations is considered. The messaging from government and the Directorate General of Taxation was not coherent. Service was pitted against collecting more tax from HWIs to suspicious taxpayers. Furthermore, the Directorate was racked by conflict over mechanisms for supporting the HWI initiative, in particular, the sharing of files and case records, and building integrated databases to give a comprehensive picture of the assets of HWIs.
Last but not least, Indonesia's taxpaying culture was completely different from countries like Australia that had successfully set up a HWI unit (J. Braithwaite 2005) . Indonesia found limited public support for the initiative and provided only superficial political leadership. In Indonesia most people do not pay tax as detailed below. Only a small portion of Indonesia's labour force is even registered in the tax system. Trust in the tax authorities is low. Rounding up the very wealthy and extracting tax from them in this climate seemed to one informant like an expedition to hunt animals in the zoo. In contrast, Australia's high wealth individual initiative was introduced in a climate where wage and salary earners and most Australians were paying their tax and were acutely aware that high wealth individuals were disproportionately benefitting from loopholes to avoid tax. Politically, Australia's HWI policy was introduced to bring fairness into the tax system (The Auditor General 2000). It was not threatening to the vast majority of the electorate who were already paying their tax, and therefore it had public support.
Background: HWI policy in Indonesia High wealth individual units
Generally speaking, HWI units comprise a group of highly skilled tax officers within a tax authority who follow the wealthiest individuals and the business entities that they control. The mission of HWI units is threefold: to acquire detailed knowledge of the tax affairs of HWI taxpayers; to ensure they pay the taxes that they owe; and to have informed input into new tax law and the development of tax policy. Knowledge feeds into investigative processes, and both inform policy formulation and legislation (J. Braithwaite 2003) . Since HWIs and the entities that they control have resources dedicated to minimizing the tax they pay, a cat and mouse game is constantly in play with tax jurisdictions tweaking their rules and re-writing laws to enable them to collect tax, and taxpayers scrutinizing the changes to find ways around or through the net that has been put in place to catch them (Ford 2011) . In a globalised world where taxpaying by the wealthy is often a matter of choice rather than obligation, all tax administrations perhaps need the capacities of a HWI unit.
Reforming Indonesia's tax system through personal income tax
Indonesia's tax-to-GDP ratio is one of the lowest in the G-20 and among emerging markets (IMF 2011, p. 20) . Indonesia has traditionally relied heavily on tax collections from corporations. Corporate income tax contributes a much higher portion to the revenue collected by DGT than personal income tax (Francis 2012, p. 17) , constituting 81 per cent of total income tax revenue (Nugraha and Lewis 2013) . Arnold (2012) asserted that 'key differences between Indonesia's tax structure and those of OECD countries -and to a lesser degree also those of ASEAN countries -include a strong reliance on corporate income tax revenues and low personal income tax revenues' (p. 7).
This has meant that Indonesia's tax collections are relatively more vulnerable to downturns in the global economy. The IMF recommended the country extend its personal income tax base (IMF 2011, p. 21) . Data in 2011 showed that the total number of registered taxpayers 2 was 19.11 million comprising 16.88 million individual taxpayers, 1.76 million corporate taxpayers, and 0.47 million treasurer taxpayers 3 . The total work-force 4 population was recorded as 116. The public commitment masked a covert agenda. The aspiration for the program at headquarters was more ambitious. Through building improved relationships with HWIs and their advisers, DGT was looking for a more cooperative relationship with this segment of the taxpaying population and a better understanding of the tax arrangements of the very wealthy (IMF 2009, p. 6) . Improved relationships with the very wealthy were expected to have a further benefit, trickling down to create better relationships with all other individual taxpayers. Through an enhanced relationship with their tax authority, DGT argued, taxpayers would more readily accept, abide by and learn about their tax obligations.
DGT's aspirations for the program were not realised. In February 2012, the program was wound back.
The unit lost its separate status and was folded into the office that controlled and monitored large taxes for state-owned enterprises in the service sector.
Present study: contestation over HWI implementation
The theoretical framework used to analyse the directions in which Indonesia took the HWI program is adapted from Braithwaite and Drahos' (2000) work on global business regulation. Braithwaite and Drahos argued that as regulatory models spread globally, contests took place among powerful actors, or more precisely nodes of powerful actors. Powerful actors compete for the ascendancy of their particular goals and objectives. Goals and objectives are integrated under principles that will spearhead change and attract support from followers. Building support for these principles is not left to chance. Powerful actors seek out mechanisms that encourage the pursuit of favoured principles and prevent or slow down the pursuit of competing principles. The model of global regulatory change can also be applied to the struggles that occur within organizations as they seek to reform institutional structures and processes.
Central to the operations of the HWI unit in Indonesia are contested principles advanced by powerful 5 WORKING PAPER RegNet Research Papers actors who controlled particular mechanisms "of production" within the Directorate General of Taxation. The contest was fierce within DGT as evidenced by changes in leadership and philosophy at the most senior levels after the first few months of the HWI unit's operation.
The mechanisms used to control the course of events include concrete actions and tasks such as developing new integrated data bases, attracting the best staff, seeking advice from more experienced tax administrations, and setting revenue targets. But as Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) argue, mechanisms can be more abstract. They point to reward, coercion and capacity building as higher order mechanisms. These abstract mechanisms were embedded in webs of dialogue and control within the DGT and had a profound effect on how the contest of principles and grounded mechanisms played out.
The rise and fall of the HWI unit in Indonesia is a dynamic story where webs of control and webs of dialogue (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000) were constantly at work, extending beyond the new unit into the heart of DGT to change the mentality and practices of the organization. Webs of control promote actors, principles and mechanisms through systems of prescriptive and proscriptive demands.
Resistance is suppressed through sanctions of both a positive and negative kind, and ways of operating become 'frozen into' the psyche of the organization. Opportunities for thinking differently are closed off or become unattractive. Practices become conservative and are rigidly adhered to with noone wishing to risk making a mistake.
In contrast, webs of dialogue rely on persuasion and education. Webs of dialogue provide more space for involved actors to participate in the process of policy implementation through formal and informal channels of communication. Powerful actors with webs of dialogue may be just as ambitious to pursue their agenda as those with webs of control, but the means of winning support is different. They execute their agenda through conversation and debate. Resistance is dealt with through listening, adapting and reinvention, mindful of the broader principles, but open to re-configuring sub-goals and mechanisms in response to feedback from other actors in the network.
In practice, webs of control and webs of dialogue co-exist in organizations and networks and will be used by the same actor at different points in time. Problem solving may invite dialogue. An adversarial prosecution against a wealthy and powerful HWI on the other hand may require considerable control of information flows and actions. At times, webs of control can become dominant and entrenched.
Generally as a consequence, webs of dialogue will suffer. Feedback from the periphery of the network is likely to flow less freely, identification of problems is less likely to be discussed openly, and solving problems is less likely to be inclusive and cooperative.
Webs of control and dialogue both shaped the operations of the HWI unit in Indonesia. Webs of dialogue flourished in the set-up period. These webs enabled capacity building, providing support for the HWI unit and giving it a central operational role in the Directorate General of Taxation. This paper demonstrates how the balance between webs of dialogue and webs of control shifted as the HWI unit 6 WORKING PAPER RegNet Research Papers began to flex its muscles. Webs of control and coercion were mobilised to discredit, demoralise and limit HWI functioning. Capacity building around the HWI unit gave way to punishment and coercion to steer activities in a different direction. Ultimately, webs of control with their roots in traditional norms and practices of the Directorate General of Taxation prevailed in the disestablishment of the HWI unit.
Data from interviews and documents: The rise and fall of the HWI unit
Data collection
The primary source of data were interviews with 54 individuals who were involved in or had observed implementation or had an interest in high wealth individual units in Indonesia or Australia.
Interviewees included 20 from the Directorate General of Taxation, 10 tax consultants and advisers to HWIs within Indonesia, 12 officials from the Australian Taxation office, and 4 external advisers (from the IMF and the OECD). The remaining interviews included 3 taxpayers, 2 government representatives, and 7 from professional associations and universities in Indonesia. 5 In addition to interviews, documents were collated on the HWI program in Indonesia and Australia.
These sources were used to triangulate interview findings and provide further detail on issues raised in the interviews. Sources of data included websites and reports of government agencies, nongovernmental institutions, media organizations and research institutions. Tax authorities were the most important sources of documentation. In a few cases in Indonesia, when documentation was not publicly available, a special request was submitted. While some requests were granted, others were not successful, mainly due to confidentiality concerns.
Phase 1: Service versus revenue
Phase 1 of the HWI unit ran from its inception in May 2009 for three months, under the leadership of the Director General who put forward the HWI proposal to government as a 'quick wins' program. The major proposed change was a shift in principles from reaching revenue targets by coercion to delivering service and building trust so that taxes could be collected cooperatively, efficiently and fairly. The IMF reported the logic behind Indonesia's reform agenda in this way: "Originally, the DGT decided to focus on taxpayer service and outreach and to postpone audits for the first year of operations. DGT leaders reasoned that taxpayers would be more compliant in the long run if they fully understood their tax responsibilities and were given a chance to comply voluntarily" (IMF 2011, p. 14).
The change was substantial. The principle that has driven the Indonesian tax system traditionally is revenue collection. The primary mechanism for its achievement is the setting of revenue targets for different geographical regions by head office. Lerche (1980, p.50) referred to Indonesia as having a 'target' tax system; that is, a tax system in which the achievement of revenue targets, allocated to local offices through a top-down process, is the ultimate goal. What Lerche observed more than three decades ago is still relevant in Indonesia today. Achieving revenue targets at the end of the financial year is used as a performance indicator against which a regional office and its chief are evaluated.
Achieving revenue targets could mean promotion or at least deployment to a more strategic position. 6 7 WORKING PAPER
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Failing to achieve them, on the other hand, is likely to lead to demotion, which might entail transfer to an 'undesirable' location. Rewards, punishment, revenue target allocation from head office, leading to revenue collection define the traditional mechanisms and the prime principle of the Indonesian tax system.
Monitoring tax collectors who may use illegitimate means to achieve targets is not easy given how dispersed tax offices are across almost 1000 inhabited islands in Indonesia. The World Bank found that Indonesians neither trusted nor held DGT in high regard (World Bank 2003) . A former DGT director acknowledged that dealing with corruption was the major problem facing DGT (Pakpahan 2009, p.2) . This continued to be of concern at the time of interviewing. In the words of a former tax Taxation in our country is coming into a new era with a new mindset. Let us leave behind our past tax system, full of uncertainties, dirty games, non-transparent processes, under the table transactions, and its unacceptable 'take-and-give' approach. (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, cited in HWI TSO 2010, p. 12). The President's directive for a 'new mindset' around taxpaying and tax collecting was about winning public confidence. As DGT saw it, HWIs were a good group to start with. DGT decided to correct its low tax-to-GDP ratio through finding 'a way for making [wealthy] individual taxpayers pay their fair share of taxes …' (RI037, former tax official).
The DGT offered quality service to wealthy individuals in exchange for their tax. Within Indonesia's taxpaying culture, HWI taxpayers were seen as powerful actors who were deserving of special consideration by DGT. Reward in the form of quality service was seen as compensation for the tax they had paid and acknowledgment of their economic status and political power (RI011, legislative member; RI016, other organization).
Within western cultures with charters of taxpayer rights and service expectations, the idea that those with wealth were deserving of superior treatment to those without wealth would be unacceptable, at least formally. Taxpayer charters are about consistency and impartiality in the treatment received. But this was not the understanding of a service culture within DGT. Respect for HWI taxpayers should be understood in its cultural context. First, most Indonesians are not paying any personal tax at all.
Singling out high wealth individuals who were contributing more personal tax than the majority of Indonesians required a degree of diplomacy on the part of DGT. Second, it was acceptable to treat This way of thinking about high wealth individuals and their taxpaying masked the difference between the principle of service, as understood in western tax administrations as offering politeness, information and rights to review to taxpayers, and the principle of impartiality, meaning not being captured by powerful and wealthy taxpayers. Confusion around the meaning of service was to prove problematic for the fledgling HWI unit.
The emphasis on the new principle of service for HWIs was communicated to DGT staff:
The establishment of this [HWI] Tax Service Office is a manifestation of Government's appreciation of the wealthy taxpayers who have or should have made a significant contribution to the State revenues and is also intended to ensure that wealthy taxpayers get better service in fulfilling their tax rights and obligations as well as in obtaining information in relation to tax laws in a more complete and timely manner. For supporters of the HWI unit within DGT, the philosophy of quality service made sense: …the Director General said, '… your job is to improve their [HWI taxpayers'] compliance … to change [their behaviour] from not compliant into more compliant. What will we do? By providing better service, reminding them [with regard to their tax obligations] and so forth. There will be breakthroughs such that, at the end, taxpayers will feel that we have started to become friends '. (RI024, tax official) This strategy appealed to operational HWI staff. They were very aware of DGT's negative relationships with taxpayers: I think they have had bad perceptions of the tax office. They could not believe it when we came [to introduce ourselves]. I just met with their confidants. They have built up relational distance with us [as tax officers] and the tax office. Our task, in my opinion, is working out how to change the bad perceptions that already have existed in the minds of the public regarding tax officials and DGT as an institution. (RI022, tax official)
The Director General's interpretation of the HWI policy in this phase as 'relationship improvement first, and revenue collection later' was implemented on the ground by DGT's most highly skilled and carefully selected staff. As one staff member (RI027, tax official) observed, they were proud to be part 9 WORKING PAPER RegNet Research Papers of this new unit designed to improve Indonesia's tax system. They undertook activities to build relationships with taxpayers and their advisers (e.g., by visiting taxpayers and introducing staff designated as a taxpayer's contact person) and worked at understanding taxpayers' profiles through taxpayer database development (e.g., by compiling data from internal or external sources in a program developed by HWI unit's staff). They did not do any compliance activities such as auditing.
Part of the reason for not auditing was insufficient confidence that the HWI unit had the information that they needed if they were to be more successful in collecting personal income tax. In the words of one tax official, taxpayers' data were 'messy' (RI024, tax official). Before taxpayers came to be administered by the HWI unit, they had been administered in other tax offices around the Jakarta region. Taxpayers' physical data (e.g., master file, tax returns, assessment letters, audit reports, etc.)
were scattered across those tax offices. Apart from collecting these files, the HWI unit needed to compile a more sophisticated data base which linked high wealth individuals to the entities which they controlled before they could accurately assess the tax obligations of the wealthy. These data also had to be collected by staff in the HWI unit. In the eyes of actors at the operational levels, these two elements -improved relationship with taxpayers and an informed taxpayers' database -were the HWI unit's priorities before starting compliance activities.
In the first two or three years we wanted to develop good relationships with HWI taxpayers. (RI027, tax official)
We weren't supported by adequate taxpayer data [to undertake compliance activities]. Both internally -information generated from tax returns, and externally -information gathered from other institutions. (RI021, tax official)
A step too far? Unhelpful mechanisms and too few helpful ones
Tax officials in DGT were aware that they would not be able to achieve the new objectives quickly.
They also seemed aware of potential tensions as they moved away from old principles and mechanisms:
The initial purpose … was to turn our tax revenue [from mainly corporate income tax to personal income tax]. If our policy focus was revenue, then we gave more attention on corporate taxpayers, because in the short-term it could generate revenue easier. But, if we wanted to increase revenue from individuals there were a lot of things that should be done, and it is long-term. (RI022, tax official) Up-skilling staff so that they had the skills to pursue taxes from high wealth individuals was another issue requiring development time. A respondent from the ATO's HWI Taskforce, who was advising Indonesia's HWI unit, noted that it was not easy to deal with the complexities of the HWIs and their entities.
The first reason is the law on which they tend to operate … is very complex … very complex to understand. And the other issue is that they tend to have very sophisticated lawyers. So it is not just income tax law that you have to be concerned with, it's also administrative law. Not all of us are lawyers. ( The problem was made worse by communication protocols in the bureaucracy. The HWI unit formally was a low ranking unit. This meant that it could not communicate directly with any office that had higher ranking within the Ministry of Finance and outside without going through DGT headquarters, at the very least through Regional Office. This complicated and delayed processes of pooling together information on HWIs, the entities they controlled and their assets significantly. For one former tax official, failure to have an integrated database doomed the HWI unit:
Why do you think the HWI unit is considered unsuccessful? The HWI unit cannot function optimally, because it cannot see taxpayers and their business activities as a whole. Because it could be that all their lifestyles are financed by the company, all their investments are made on behalf of the company and the unit has no access on it. (RI029, former tax official) While principles and mechanisms were being contested internally, the public perception of the integrity of the new HWI unit was also in the firing line. The lack of transparency with the whole of the operational plan led by DGT was to lead the HWI unit into troubled waters. The motives behind 'service' haunted the HWI unit.
Formally … what we disclosed to the public was that this unit was established to provide [HWI] The threat of being monitored did not escape attention from those most likely to be affected. Tax advisers were sceptical about the genuine intention of the publicly proclaimed 'service' policy:
We had negative experiences [with the DGT] … the DGT always spoke ambiguously … they had a hidden agenda [with this unit]. (RI005, tax consultant)
The HWI unit? I think it is like 'hunting in the zoo'. (RI003, tax consultant) Hunting in the zoo relayed a sense of threat and cynicism about DGT. This expression is equivalent to the better-known English expression 'shooting fish in a barrel'. HWIs were known to tax authorities, they were among the few already paying some tax, and getting them to pay more was arguably easier than searching for new targets among Indonesia's unregistered taxpayers.
Outsiders following the HWI unit's implementation expressed concerns that DGT would exploit HWIs to increase personal income tax revenue. The new arrangements allowed a better view of the activities of HWI individuals and their enterprises. The probability of DGT offering a better service as per the HWI unit's publicly stated objective was unlikely.
These data revealed the obstacles faced by the HWI unit. In terms of principles, the idea of 'relationship improvement first, and revenue collection later' was not transparently shared and embraced. The philosophy gave rise to deep suspicion in a low tax morale country. The mechanisms for reform, namely the HWI unit, the integrated database of HWIs and their entities, and a well-trained and highly skilled workforce required sustained effort and time for development. This did not sit comfortably alongside the President's directive of needing a 'quick wins' program. Moreover, principles and mechanisms were clashing within DGT. Building relationships, staff capacity and a richly informed database elevated the status of the HWI unit in DGT and put it on a collision course with the entrenched revenue target system run on a regional basis. Outside DGT, financial advisers and presumably HWIs were alarmed at the possibility of DGT knowing too much about their HWIs' business interests. Added to these difficulties, disquiet grew within DGT about the whole reform approach at the most senior levels. A former high-level official openly disclosed his disagreement with the idea to use service as strategy when dealing with HWIs as follows: 'Taxpayers are never expecting service from us. That is not what they expected. Do not ever think that by providing a better service they will be more compliant. That is not true.' (RI029, former tax official).
Externally, some consultants were critical of the way the HWI unit had been structured, one calling it 'a toothless tiger' (RI001, tax consultant). Another commented: 'This unit cannot stand alone, right? It must be supported by other elements that must be created, so that the unit can be successful. If there are no such elements, as it is now, it's useless.' (RI008, tax consultant).
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Clearly, the HWI unit was encountering opposition. The new Director General came into office giving a different meaning to Indonesia's HWI policy.
Phase 2: High wealth individual implementation -back on track?
Phase 2 defined the operation of the HWI unit until April 2012 under a new Director General.
Subsequently it lost its stand-alone status. The Director General was dissatisfied with the achievements of the HWI unit. The unit was rolled into the Jakarta office that looked after the taxpaying of state-owned enterprises in the service sector.
As documented in an IMF report: 'With the change in the Director General … the focus [of the HWI unit] changed quickly to enforcement and audits' (IMF 2011, p. 14 Expounding the importance of revenue was lost on HWI staff. They were confused by the sudden change of direction.
But it was not even a year [of the HWI unit's operation], then the Director General was replaced. The new Director General … you know … His direction was not clear enough. We were always being commanded to do compliance activities. We … people on the ground … got confused. How could we do compliance activities if the data we had were not strong enough? (RI002, tax official) This respondent continued to explain how HWI staff set aside their work on revamping the database and collecting data in order to better understand taxpayers' business structures. Information was still being gathered from third parties, but not systematically. Getting such data was merely intended to generate revenue either from counselling or auditing. 10 The HWI unit was seen as a means to achieving revenue targets. The unit no longer had special status. It was on a par with other tax offices and was expected to perform accordingly.
Substantial change in policy direction at the top, without involving actors who had been implementing the HWI policy on the ground, made staff feel like they were 'walking against the wind' (RI009, tax auditor). The task they were being assigned did not seem to fit with the 'new mindset' that the President had foreshadowed for the tax authority. The HWI unit had no policy document to fall back on which defined its functions and operations.
As one mid-level official put it: 'The blue print should have been made when this unit was first established ….Whoever the DGT's Director General is, that blue print would be applied. In fact [it] did not exist.' (RI002, tax official).
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The IMF confirmed the problem: '[T]here is still no written and approved comprehensive broad-based strategy document necessary to provide direction to the various Directorate stakeholders [in relation to the HWI policy].' (IMF 2011, p. 14) Formal documentation showed the pressure on the HWI unit and its staff. A report from the Ministry of Finance stated:
The relatively small tax revenue the unit generated compared to other units under the Large Taxpayer 
From webs of dialogue to webs of control
Particularly marked in the transition from Phase 1 to Phase 2 was the rapid change in balance of webs of dialogue and webs of control. Webs of dialogue were in the ascendancy in Phase 1 as old institutions were challenged. In Phase 2 they were closed down as webs of control re-established old institutions.
Dialogic webs play a central role in building consensus and cooperation around 'issue definition' (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000, p. 553) . Influential actors utilise their position to define the crucial issue that requires action. Other actors may have different views, or at the very least, understand and interpret the issue differently. Webs of dialogue allow for shared understandings to emerge and for concerns and objections to be addressed. The outcome desired from this dialogic process is to redefine the interests of actors and elicit cooperation to solve the identified problem.
The idea of establishing a HWI unit in Indonesia arose out of concern that the tax compliance of all Indonesians, but particularly the very wealthy, was extremely low and it needed to be lifted -to improve revenue from personal income tax across the board and the integrity of the tax system. One Dialogue between staff at the HWI unit and higher-level officials in the Ministry of Finance and DGT not only occurred in relation to defining the crucial issue, but continued into the implementation phase for several months. A paper was produced by staff at the HWI unit (HWI TSO 2010b), which discussed problems they encountered in the first few months of the HWI unit's operation and suggestions for improvement.
In the early period of the HWI unit's operation [i.e., before the Director General was replaced], we had relatively intensive dialogue with the headquarters and regional office. We provided a lot of feedback about the SOPs [standard operating procedures], how the HWI unit should operate [and] constraints we faced on the ground. We even produced a special report and gave it to headquarters. (RI024, tax official) Section heads had routine meetings to discuss problems we faced in our jobs ... there was no gap between sections [in this HWI office] as we often heard in other offices. We delineated the problems and advised headquarters. (RI027, tax official) An IMF advisor confirmed that communication and discussion was frequent and intensive among various DGT directorates with a stake in the HWI initiative in Phase 1. Nevertheless, these kinds of internal communication forums were not yet institutionalised in the DGT; rather, meetings occurred on an ad hoc basis.
While internally the principles of 'relationship improvement first, and revenue collection later' were discussed and promoted, the external messaging of the critical issue carried an emphasis on service, not collecting revenue. DGT made an effort to extend dialogic webs to include stakeholders outside the organisation such as tax advisers, lawyers, accountants, and business or investment consultants as well as HWIs. Potential HWI taxpayers were invited to a series of meetings prior to the establishment of the HWI unit (RI002, tax official). 11 They were told that when their tax administration was moved from their tax office around Jakarta to the new HWI unit, they would be provided with a better service (RI020, RI030, tax official and former tax official respectively). Lower-level staff viewed this pressure unfavourably and '…started to be demotivated' (RI025, tax official). They felt they were treated unfairly, their ideas and suggestions were no longer heard, and problems they faced were not supported. HWI staff on the ground grew anxious about their careers and positions (RI024, tax official), and started to demonstrate attitudes of helplessness:
We were in a very difficult position … you know what I mean? … If we followed DG's [Director General] instruction [to do compliance activities at this stage] we had no sufficient capability [expertise, data, and experience for doing audit to HWIs]. If we did not follow his direction we would be punished and perceived to be underperforming. (RI019, tax official) According to one tax adviser, the revenue orientation changed the function of audit:
The taxpayer was annoyed. Audit, for example … Audit should be carried out to examine whether the taxpayer has followed the rules …What happened was that the audit functioned to generate revenue. Audit was given [revenue] targets. (RI003, tax adviser).
The dialogue that had been developing with stakeholders weakened: 'Yes … it [relationship with taxpayers and tax advisers] was changed dramatically following changes in policy direction and they could feel the change.' (RI019, tax official).
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Stakeholders from outside DGT were confused about what had happened with the HWI unit. To some extent, the sudden change in orientation to compliance activities confirmed suspicions about DGT's untrustworthiness: 'We are confused by the HWI policy. DGT was inconsistent in running the policy … we had such an experience in the past.' (RI005, tax adviser)
Others saw the HWI unit as following in the footsteps of the tax offices that had originally administered them. A respondent from the HWI unit explained his designated taxpayers' reaction in this way: '… many of them [taxpayers] assumed that they would be caught, put in a 'cage' -using their terminology -and ready to be slaughtered at any time.' (RI002, tax official) Even in Phase 1, external actors remembered the DGT of the past and they were suspicious of DGT's agenda. Phase 2 confirmed suspicions. The inconsistency between promises in Phase 1 and actual practice in Phase 2 did not go unnoticed by HWIs and their advisers. Any new trusting relationships that were being built with outside stakeholders subsequently disintegrated. Phase 2 of the HWI initiative brought in its wake 'confrontational' relationships with outside stakeholders. HWI advisers met tax officials not as policy stakeholders who could give feedback on the policy, but rather as taxpayer representatives protecting their clients' interests in audit activities.
Opposition mounted to the HWI unit. The IMF had suggested that the HWI unit that had originally been set up in Jakarta should be rolled out to other areas. The idea was that in time each regional office would have one unit dedicated to administering HWIs in that region. HWIs living outside Jakarta had been untouched by the HWI initiative. The recommendation was rejected. An internal DGT document explained the decision: … our cost-benefit analysis suggested … establishing a new unit specifically intended for administering HWI taxpayers is not the right option … From the collection cost efficiency ratio [CCER] point of view, administering HWI taxpayers by establishing dedicated units in other regions is inefficient. (Director General of Taxation n.d., p. 6) Within less than three short years the principles and objectives behind the HWI had been reduced to short-term revenue collection. The HWI unit lost resources to set in place mechanisms that would build capability for high wealth tax collection. The IMF noted: '[Indonesia's] tax administration remains relatively weak with poor enforcement procedures and low voluntary compliance' (IMF 2011, p. 21).
Discussion

Changing tax institutions
All tax institutions are steeped in bureaucratic traditions. They function with strong and tight webs of control. Rules and laws, policies that are risk averse, highly routinised procedures, strict privacy protocols, and clearly delineated official roles have been adopted as protection against a loss of legitimacy. But as Indonesia's experience shows, webs of control are not sufficient to establish legitimacy; and as documented in other countries, webs of control make adaptation to changing conditions difficult (Job, Stout and Smith 2007; Shover, Job and Carroll 2003) .
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Indonesia introduced a High Wealth Individual unit on the basis of need and recommendation.
Indonesia needed to find ways of increasing revenue from personal income tax. Less than 15% of those in the workforce are registered for taxpaying in Indonesia and only 60% of those registered lodge their tax returns. Its remarkably low tax registration and taxpaying rates were problems for an authority that was held in low public regard and had corruption issues. Starting the reform process with the wealthy through setting up a special unit had attractions. First, the initiative won political support at the highest level as a 'quick wins' program prior to an election campaign promising a change of culture in public administration. Second, high wealth individuals were influential and could lead a change in public opinion about the integrity of tax administration processes. Third, international advisory bodies advocated HWI units. On the basis of overseas experience, particularly that of Australia, the intention was to build a specialist workforce in DGT that was highly skilled and informed about HWI activities. From a position of knowledge and authority, they were to establish cooperative working relationships with this segment of taxpayers.
Indonesia's objectives and strategies were not dissimilar to those of many other countries. Moreover, the approach made sense in a globalised world where profit shifting is freeing corporations of their taxpaying obligations and citizens are disillusioned with their democratically elected governments for not having sufficient revenue to meet their basic needs for housing, jobs, health and education. So why in three short years was the HWI unit disestablished as an independent unit, its functions wound back and its remaining activities merged with the state-owned business line? Why did a policy with such resounding endorsement at adoption fade so quickly? What can we learn about changing institutions of taxation?
Before summarizing our findings, it is worth noting that this study focused on the observations and experiences of those most closely associated with or interested in the implementation of the HWI unit, within DGT and beyond, within Indonesia and overseas, supporters and critics. Documents were also used where available, although it was noteworthy that written plans for the development and evaluation of the unit were lacking, or not made available. This is a major limitation of the research.
We were not privy to data about the pressures exerted behind closed doors at the highest levels of government about the HWI unit. Changing the Director General within such a short period of time signals significant tussles were taking place. We leave this story for others to tell as reliable and verifiable accounts become available. While acknowledging this gap, this study allows a light to be shone on the less studied processes of dismantling a change program through the eyes of those on the ground, in particular tax officers and advisers.
The powerful actors taking centre stage in this paper were the President who campaigned for his reelection on culture change in the bureaucracy and the two Director Generals leading tax reform under the guise of a 'quick wins' program. The first Director General strongly supported the principles of 'relationship improvement now, enforcement later,' not because revenue was unimportant, but rather because building integrity into the tax system was regarded as a necessary step for growth in revenue Each of these regimes used different mechanisms to achieve their objectives. The 'relationship now, enforcement later' camp encouraged webs of dialogue within DGT and used the HWI unit as the focal point for the change program. The best officers were recruited to the unit, and plans were developed to build more comprehensive and integrated databases on the business interests of HWIs. Overseas advisers were involved in the process of setting up the HWI unit and training staff. The appetite for change within the HWI unit was high, but their task was massive.
The 'relationships now, enforcement later' camp experienced problems with both their principles and the mechanisms available to pursue them. First, database integration challenged traditional mechanisms for tax collection. It was not in the interests of local tax authorities to hand their files over to a new special unit and direct communication between the two branches of DGT was impossible.
Yet having information from local authorities and developing an integrated database was a core mechanism for equipping HWI tax officials to do their jobs.
Second, different and confusing messages were circulated around the most influential webs of dialogue, which were meant to build trust and a shared understanding of the purpose and methods of the HWI unit. The internal DGT message was 'relationship building first, enforcement later'. The external message was 'relationship building.' Relationship building was defined as offering quality service. This did not resonate with high wealth individuals, particularly not their advisers. Advisers offered quality service to HWIs on their tax affairs. The DGT was unlikely to add much value, except to clarify rules and procedures, which they did. Suspicion surrounded the existence of a special unit.
This opened way for criticism that tax culture had not changed to become more reasonable, fair, transparent and service oriented toward taxpayers.
Meanwhile internally, the HWI unit was contributing little in the way of revenue: It was not auditing 12 ; instead it was collecting data. And the public and the tax authority had not visibly "started to become friends". In short, it was not delivering as a 'quick wins' program. The time frame of the 'quick wins' program of one year was unrealistic for the tax reform envisaged. Culture does not change quickly and the 'relationship now, enforcement later' camp was vulnerable to the forces of resistance when public criticism was directed at them. Importantly, for those pursuing reform, there was no groundswell of support from taxpayers generally. Most Indonesians in the workforce did not pay tax.
High wealth individuals at least paid some. Any signs of DGT "hunting in the zoo" was bound to give rise to fear as to who might be next.
When the weaknesses of the HWI Unit became apparent, forces of resistance moved swiftly to close down the mechanisms for change. Webs of dialogue disappeared, replaced with webs of control.
Revenue targets were imposed from above, and resources and opportunity to develop integrated databases were withdrawn. Those who complied with a resumption of old ways of doing things were Therefore it is difficult to see that DGT was able to capitalise on its experiences and learn better ways of growing Indonesia's personal tax system and improving its reputation.
Conclusion: Lost opportunity to challenge culture and regulate responsively
This paper deals with the social processes that prevented the HWI unit from bringing culture change to DGT. At the most basic level there was a contest over mechanisms that created divisions over Indonesia's HWI reform. Who held records and who was the 'owner' of an integrated database created delays and disrupted the momentum in establishing the HWI unit. Failure to make progress with the integrated database weakened the power of the HWI unit so that it became questionable whether DGT would be able to do anything when faced with HWI non-compliance. It lost enforcement credentials. In terms of service credentials, the HWI initiative was hobbled by the public's long-held perception of DGT as a 'corrupt institution' (World Bank 2003) . Perceptions of lack of integrity were fuelled when the HWI unit revealed to outsiders only half the truth about their future plans for collecting more tax from the very wealthy. Finally, the principles underpinning the legitimacy of the HWI unit became confused through failing to communicate openly and consistently both trust in their taxpayers to do the right thing, along with power to coerce compliance should that be necessary.
Through the HWI unit DGT was experimenting with changing its culture to develop the governance capacity of responsiveness to taxpayers' expectations and needs. The hopes for it were many: to build trust and cooperation with the taxpaying community, especially high wealth individuals, to develop a service culture within DGT, to increase revenue from personal tax, and engender a spirit of tax compliance. They were neither unreasonable nor inconsistent goals. But the sequencing, time frame and communication to the public were flawed. Possibly understanding of the link between service and enforcement was also lacking within DGT and contributed to inability to pre-empt looming legitimacy challenges.
Compliance is not a static state, and the HWI unit was tasked with moving individuals and the entities they controlled into a state of greater compliance. This kind of move should not be understood simply as reciprocation for the assistance provided by the tax authority or as a gentle nudge that satisfies psychologically (Thaler and Sunstein 2008) . For issues where compliance demands willingness to defer to authority, there is need for both trust in the relationship and enforcement capacity. The link between service and enforcement is symbiotic.
Responsive regulatory theory explains this symbiosis, and how it operates in the tax context (ATO 2008; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; Braithwaite and Braithwaite 2001) . According to the theory, there is agreement that an authority has both capacity and willingness to use its power to enforce compliance. But exercising this power is not the first preference of the authority. This power is in the background as authorities persuade and encourage compliance. The principle is for an authority to use only as much force as is required to elicit compliance. The message from authority is a 20 WORKING PAPER RegNet Research Papers preference for settling differences in as non-adversarial a manner as possible.
Importantly, responsive regulatory theory requires open political debate to ensure that there is public support for enforcement and the law, that both are considered fair and reasonable, and that the authority can be held to account. Responsive regulation depends on legitimizing the power that an authority can wield with the public (Braithwaite 2003) . In this regard, DGT was at a distinct disadvantage.
The HWI unit was engaging with the elements of responsive regulation in their 'relationship improvement now, enforcement later' philosophy: Everyone was deserving of quality service, cooperation in taxpaying was to be encouraged and welcomed, but where cooperation was not forthcoming, coercive measures would be pursued. But the HWI agenda was construed as one of service then enforcement, and not as a joint service-enforcement agenda. The reasons for sequencing DGT action were insufficient knowledge about HWIs for effective enforcement action and a public that ascribed dubious integrity to DGT. Yet both messages of service and enforcement needed to be heard. Before cooperating, taxpayers needed to be assured that they would not be punished and treated disrespectfully. Those who were trying to evade the system, however, needed to be aware that the authority could and would take action against them. As Kirchler and colleagues put it (Kirchler 2007; Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl 2008) , taxpayers need to be aware of a tax authority's willingness to trust as well as power to enforce to maximise cooperation and prevent a slippery slope to non-compliance.
As the HWI unit lost support, it had neither the capacity to persuade nor the capacity to enforce high wealth individuals to pay their taxes. It did not have time to build an enduring alliance of powerful actors, mechanisms or principles to further its reform objectives. It did not have support from the general public to push back against powerful interests that resisted change. Instead, the HWI unit earned the reputation of being either "useless" or "hunting in the zoo." Either way the result was far from the change of mindset that would give Indonesians confidence in a competent and fair tax authority.
The implementation of Indonesia's High Wealth Individual unit holds lessons for taxation policy in a globalised world. As nation states and international bodies attempt to harmonise and transfer policies to deal with trade and commerce across national boundaries, it is important to acknowledge that local institutions and understandings will shape any reform process, no matter how much political support there is for the innovation, and no matter how much support is provided from neighbouring states and international bodies.
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Notes
1 The term 'net wealth' or 'net worth' in general refers to total assets minus total liabilities. Both terms are used interchangeably in this paper. 2 The Indonesian tax authority categorises taxpayers into three groups: individual, legal entities, and treasurer taxpayers. Taxpayers in the individual and legal entities categories are obliged to file a tax return, but treasurer taxpayers are not obliged to file annual tax returns. Treasurer taxpayers are treasurers in government agencies whose role is administering financial matters of the agency. In the taxation context their role is mainly as withholding agents for taxes such as salary and wages and VAT.
3 Legal entity taxpayers include enterprises (including state owned enterprises), firms, cooperatives, foundations, mass organizations, partnerships, and political organisations. 4 The total labour force comprises people aged fifteen and older who meet the International Labour Organization (ILO) definition of the economically active population: all people who supply labour for the production of goods and services during a specified period (World Bank 2012). Data for Indonesia was available up to 2011 at the time of writing.
5 All interviews were conducted by the senior author, with the majority being recorded and transcribed afterwards.
The Indonesian interviews were conducted between 3 January 2012 and 19 April 2013. The Australian interviews were conducted between 22 September 2011 and 30 May 2012. Fifty one were conducted face-to-face (four with telephone or email follow-up), two were telephone interviews and one was an email exchange. The interviews lasted an average of fifty minutes, with the longest interview lasting one hour and twenty minutes, and the shortest fourteen minutes. 6 Moving to headquarters, for instance, although still in the same level/echelon, is an example of a more strategic position and is regarded as promotion. In contrast, moving to another office in an "unfavourable' place (e.g. a rural area) is regarded as demotion although the level/echelon is unchanged. 7 After the first year, the HWI unit was given a revenue target of 563 billion Rupiah. 8 That is, the period in which staff members were required to develop relationships with taxpayers and their advisers and to develop a taxpayers' database. 9 Atambua is a small city in East Nusa Tenggara province near the East Timor border. It is a common belief within the Indonesian bureaucracy that being moved to a small rural city, especially one outside Java, is 'punishment'. 10 Counselling refers to a practice used by DGT to clarify any discrepancy found in the tax return using external data. In this process, it is possible that the taxpayer would agree with the DGT's findings and pay the additional tax owed, or defend his position by providing an explanation and evidence with regard to the discrepancy. With the latter condition, DGT can accept the taxpayer's explanation and close the case, or refuse the taxpayer's explanation and ask the taxpayer to pay the tax owed. If taxpayers refuse to pay the tax owed in this counselling stage, then this process can be escalated into auditing or investigation depending on whether or not there is an element of criminal offence in the case. 
